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Abstract
This paper investigates empirical determinants of current account posi-
tions worldwide with a focus on the countries that started out as the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (including Greece that joined in 2001). Specifically,
it addresses the question whether current accounts inside the Eurozone have
reacted more sensitively to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals due to
the facilitation of inter-country financial flows and the abolishment of for-
eign currency risk. Comparing estimation results for different country sam-
ples over the period from 1998 to 2009, I find some indication that capital
outflows/inflows might have reacted more sensitively to different develop-
ment levels, growth rates, and competitiveness levels inside the European
Monetary Union. Measuring these differences as interaction effects, I do
not find that current account positions are significantly more sensitive in the
Euro area compared to other advanced economies however. Therefore, ev-
idence that the common currency facilitated current account divergence in
the period under consideration is found to be weak.
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1 Introduction
This Paper examines the determinants of current account (CA) positions with a fo-
cus on the European Monetary Union (EMU), that is arguably the most economi-
cally important currency union of all times. Currency unions, in general, alleviate
foreign exchange risks in capital transactions between their member states and of-
fer them facilitated access to international capital markets. At the same time, the
EMU has seen remarkable CA divergence during the years from its establishment
until the sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, it could be assumed that capital has
been driven by changes in macroeconomic fundamentals in a stronger way in the
EMU than in other country samples for this period of time. This paper seeks to
explore whether this has indeed been the case for the period from 1998 to 2009.
Specifically, it computes marginal effects for the driving forces of CA imbalances
for different sets of countries, one being the EMU. That way it can be determined
how different country samples differ with respect to their CA determination and
how countries in the EMU compare to them. In a second step, the countries form-
ing the EMU are interacted with other advanced economies in order to determine
whether the coefficients differ significantly from those estimated for countries that
can be considered similar with respect to their political and economic structure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction to
the CA in general and discusses models that can explain the differentials observed
in it theoretically. A brief discussion of the potential dangers of large CA deficits
justifying the topic as a research interest is also included in this part. Section 3
shows the behavior of CA positions in the EMU in recent years. Section 4 sum-
marizes the empirical literature both on CAs in general and on their occurrence
in the EMU. Section 5 describes the data and the estimation procedure, Section 6
presents the results, and section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
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2 The Current Account
2.1 Definition
Worldwide financial integration enables countries or economies to consume either
more or less than they produce via the opportunity of international borrowing or
lending. Thus, it becomes possible for an economy to borrow money from abroad
to finance current consumption in excess of current production. This will occur at
the cost of debts against the rest of the world, which have to be repaid in the future
including interest payments. The change of this overall financial position against
the rest of the world in a given year is called the current account. Following
common notation, as used for example in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), it can be
defined as
CAt = Bt+1−Bt
where CAt is a country‘s CA in year t, and Bt is that country‘s endowment of
foreign assets or liabilities in that year. The CA can also be written as
CAt = Yt + rtBt−Ct−Gt− It
whereYt is output in year t, r is the interest rate, C is private consumption, G
is government consumption, and I is investment. The equation thus states that
the CA consists of production minus consumption (both private and public) and
investment plus net interest rate payments received on foreign assets (or on foreign
liabilities if that term is negative). Finally, in many cases it is convenient to define
national savings S as
St = Yt + rtBt−Ct−Gt
The equation states that everything that is produced and earned on foreign assets
but neither consumed by either the government or private households is necessar-
ily saved instead. With the help of this definition, it is possible to define the CA
in a simpler way as savings minus investment.
2
CAt = St− It
This definition is sometimes convenient to test empirically, for example in pa-
pers that try to determine whether the emergence of large CA imbalances has
been driven mainly by changes in the investment rate or in the savings rate (e.g.
Blanchard & (2002), Chinn & Ito (2007) or Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon (2010).
Moreover, the selection of determinants for CA positions in empirical papers, that
will be discussed in section 4, has often been motivated by variables that had
previously been found to be important driving forces of saving and investment
decisions.
2.2 Theories for Current Account Imbalances
CA imbalances are subject to many economic models both explicitly and im-
plicitly. These models can give a rationale for the choice of the variables that
are included in empirical estimations of CA positions. It appears that the most
heavily discussed variables in the theoretical literature on CA determination are
development measures (relative GDP and growth) and fiscal surplus (where the
theoretical argument revolves around the presence or absence of Ricardian equiv-
alence in many models) while there is also a theoretical justification for including
a variable capturing the demographic structure. I will focus on the development
strand of literature first and briefly discuss two of the most prominent theoretical
explanations there, the intertemporal consumption model and neoclassical growth.
A very common approach to the modelling of CA imbalances have been intertem-
poral consumption models (see, for example, Sachs (1981 & 1982) and especially
Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996) chapter 4 for a detailed description). In these mod-
els representative consumers (basically the whole economy) allocate consump-
tion over time trying to realize the highest attainable utility level. Depending on
the extent of time preference, this will be associated with more or less constant
consumption paths. CA deficits or surpluses thus follow from this optimization
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procedure and are used to enable the optimal intertemporal consumption alloca-
tion. Consequently, these models generally predict countries with low GDP and
high growth rates to run CA deficits while those that have higher output initially
(and thus can be expected to see slower growth in the future) would run CA sur-
pluses in order smooth consumption.
The basic model can be and has been extended in many directions. Two of
them are particularly relevant to the specific case of the EMU. First, Giavazzi
& Spaventa (2010) develop a model with tradable and non-tradable goods and
show that the intertemporal budget constraint (demanding that all debts have to be
repaid in the future with interests) can be violated more easily as consumption of
non-traded-goods grows. In their model this occurs because debts have to be re-
paid in the future with traded goods. Consequently, if the traded sector is relatively
small, debt levels also have to be small in order to be sustainable. Empirically, the
authors report construction booms in the years before the European debt crisis in
2 of the countries that would later experience financial distress, Spain and Ireland.
Therefore, it can be argued that these countries did see a substantial part of in-
ternational capital flow into their non-traded goods sectors. Consequently, even
CA deficits that appear to be in line with the idea of intertemporal consumption
choices might be a reason for concern depending on the sector that attracts the
imported capital.
Second, Blanchard & Giavazzi‘s (2002) paper about the European Union and the
EMU especially presents a model with widening CA imbalances in the presence
of two effects: higher substitutability of goods and better access to international
capital markets. Countries with higher expected growth find it optimal to run
larger deficits under these conditions in their model. Both higher substitutabil-
ity of goods and improved access to international capital markets are likely to be
present in a currency union. This model therefore provides a theoretical rationale
not only for the inclusion of a variable measuring relative GDP but also for the
suspicion that CA positions might react to changes in it in a stronger way inside a
currency union such as the EMU.
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A slightly different way of motivating capital flows between countries relies on
neoclassical growth. One of the most prominent growth models has been devel-
oped by Solow (1956). In this model capital experiences decreasing returns as
the capital stock rises. Everything else equal, countries with lower capital stocks
should thus yield higher returns to capital and be more attractive to invest in.
Therefore, according to the model, capital flows from developed countries with
high capital stocks to developing ones with low capital stocks should be observed.
Consequently, the capital stock should have a positive effect on the CA. Therefore,
capital inflows into countries with low GDP from countries with high GDP are
predicted both by intertemporal consumption models and by neoclassical growth
models (as long as they also have higher capital stocks).
The discussion on the theoretical importance of fiscal surplus goes back till the
days of David Ricardo, who even gave it its name. Under Ricardian equiva-
lence fiscal surplus does not affect CA positions significantly. The rationale is
that households incorporate government net borrowing or lending into their con-
sumption decisions because any tax cut has to be refinanced in the future (and
vice versa). If this equivalence does in fact hold, changes in private and public
consumption will net each other out leaving the CA unaffected by fiscal surplus.
Intertemporal utility maximization over both finite and infinite periods, as implied
by the basic intertemporal consumption model, would in fact lead to this result
since the whole country is treated as one representative consumer (see Obstfeld &
Rogoff (1996), chapter 3).
Modifications of the model that give up on the utility optimization process happen-
ing over all periods make Ricardian equivalence break down however. Overlap-
ping generation models featuring mortal individuals that live for a finite number
of periods and consider only their lifetime utility do imply effects of fiscal policy
(see, for example, Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996) chapter 3). The reason is that indi-
viduals that receive tax cuts immediately will only partially (or not at all) suffer
from the contractionary fiscal effects these cuts will necessitate in the future. Also,
changes in the fiscal position can affect old and young individuals differently. A
different modification that induces the breakdown of Ricardian equivalence was
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made in Bussière et al. (2004). Their model assumes that only a fraction of the
whole population has the possibility of making optimal intertemporal consump-
tion allocation decisions while the rest of the population is liquidity constrained
and can only consume what it earns in the same period. Consequently, fiscal pol-
icy would have an effect in this scenario with the extent of it depending on the
relative sizes of the two different population groups. Models like these provide
a theoretical rationale for the inclusion of government surplus into empirical CA
specifications.
Theoretical arguments for the inclusion of a variable measuring the demographic
structure of countries can be based upon consumption theories, especially the per-
manent income hypothesis by Friedman (1957) and the life-cycle hypothesis by
Modigliani & Brumberg (1954). These models feature consumption smoothing
behavior of individuals, who make their consumption decisions based on perma-
nent income over their whole life-cycle instead of current income. Consequently,
people who are either too young or too old to be part of the labor force will con-
sume substantially more than they earn. In the context of CAs this would imply
deficits for countries that have a large fraction of their population in a non-working
age. Countries with large fractions of their population being in the labor force are
predicted to run CA surpluses however, as these individuals have a strong saving
motive for the time after retirement.
Consequently, theoretical explanations can be used to motivate the inclusion of
variables measuring the relative stage of development (captured by GDP or capital
stock), (expected) growth, fiscal surplus, and demographic structure. As will be
shown in section 4, these variables are indeed the ones that have been used in
almost every empirical paper covering CA positions. They will therefore also be
used as a rationale for the variable choice in this paper in the sections 5 and 6.
2.3 Relevance of Current Account Imbalances
Before turning to empirical values of CA positions and their potential empirical
determinants, it seems reasonable to address the question why high and persistent
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CA surpluses or deficits might raise concerns classifying them as a meaningful
subject to research interest. As Obstfeld (2012), in an article devoted to this ques-
tion, mentions, it could be claimed that as long as CAs just represent intertemporal
consumption allocation decisions, they are no reason for concern. Or, as Blan-
chard (2007) puts it, “assume that a current account deficit reflects private saving
and investment decisions. Assume rational expectations. Is there any reason for
the government to intervene and what is the optimal form of that intervention” (p.
193). In fact, Blanchard‘s (2007) verdict is that countries should rather deal with
underlying distortions (such as for example wage rigidities) than aim at a reduc-
tion of CA deficits directly.
A further argument presented by Obstfeld (2012) is that CA positions are rela-
tively small in comparison to total financial wealth abroad (due to the substantial
rise in gross international capital flows in recent years) and may thus be negligible
as the international investment position can be affected much more by changes
in the value of internationally held assets. In fact, Obstfeld‘s (2012) calculations
reveal that the correlation between net international investment positions and the
CA has become significantly weaker recently. Furthermore, as discussed by John-
son (2009), the CA merely adds up all demands and liabilities against the rest of
the world even though debts might occur against completely different countries,
people, or firms than demands. Therefore, the latter may not always equalize the
former. Consequently, pure CA data is not necessarily telling in answering the
question whether a country is able to meet its foreign liabilities.
Fortunately, there are indeed good reasons to analyze CA positions. Large CA
deficits have been found to be connected to subsequent crises empirically (e.g.
Jordà et al. (2011) or Gourinchas & Obstfeld (2012)). Furthermore, CA imbal-
ances imply externalities as they have to add up to zero by construction. Therefore,
if some countries run large surpluses, there have to be others with deficits. It has
been argued that these countries will then experience, among other effects, lower
real interest rates and higher housing prices. Bernanke‘s (2005) famous speech
about the “saving glut” (high saving rates and substantial positive CAs, especially
in Asian countries) e.g. emphasizes the relationship between CA surpluses in
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Asian economies and low real interest rates, appreciation of the dollar, and higher
real estate prices in the US.
Furthermore, countries with CA deficits depend on finance by international cap-
ital markets (e.g. Rogoff (2012)). If these markets stop financing the deficits
(for example due to a decrease in faith in the country‘s potential to repay debts),
consumption may have to be reduced dramatically. In fact, financing of EMU pe-
riphery countries such as Portugal, Spain or Greece by international capital mar-
kets arguably did end to some extent in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis
given the massive capital flights observed in these countries (see, e.g. Sinn &
Wollmershäuser (2012)). Edwards (2004) examines sudden stops of financing via
international capital markets empirically and reaches the following two results.
First, large CA changes from negative to positive are connected to sudden stops of
international finance. Second, these sudden CA turnarounds have negative effects
on growth rates. Furthermore, Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2012) find that, after the
beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, those countries faced the largest con-
tractions in CA positions that had run CA deficits that were farthest away from
what could be explained by economic fundamentals previously. Consequently,
CA deficits may be a reason for concern as the dependence on international capi-
tal can lead to the aforementioned detrimental consequences if that financing ends,
which seems to have played a role in the EMU.
3 Current Accounts in the European Monetary Union
Even though the CA of the EMU as a whole has been fairly balanced in most
years after the introduction of the Euro (the numbers can be found in Table 7
of the Appendix I), most countries experienced substantial CA imbalances in the
period of time considered. Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria and es-
pecially Luxembourg were running substantial CA surpluses as can be seen in
Figure 1. Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland on the other hand had very negative
CA balances, even below -10% percent in several years as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: CA/GDP Ratios in the Central EMU
Figure 2: CA/GDP Ratios in the Southern EMU
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However, as can be seen in Figure 2, substantial CA turnarounds occurred after
the beginning of the crisis in 2009 in deficit countries, which is the reason why
these years will not be included in the analysis. The values for the post-crisis years
might not be as telling because of structural reforms and support through EU insti-
tutions, most notably the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) lending money to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and
Spain. The divergence of CA positions until 2009 is certainly remarkable however
and raises the question whether it was in line with current account determination
for other countries during that time or represents increased responsiveness to fun-
damentals inside the EMU instead. These empirical questions are the subject of
the remaining sections.
4 Empirical Determinants of Current Accounts
In this section I address empirical investigations of CA positions concerning 3
topics. First, I cover empirical literature that has sought to determine the driving
forces of CA positions in general. As explained previously, the choice of variables
in the empirical literature is close to the ones discussed under 2.2 and/or motivated
by variables that are assumed to affect saving or investment decisions. Second, I
reference papers that deal with the question whether countries inside the EMU
have reacted more sensitively to changes in those fundamental variables. And
third, I include a short discussion concerning the question whether the divergence
of CA positions in the EMU itself represents an anomaly.
4.1 Empirical Literature on Current Accounts Worldwide
One of the first examinations of empirical determinants of CA positions in a
worldwide setting that I could find was conducted by Faruqee & Debelle (1996)
featuring data of 21 industrial countries. Cross-section analysis finds the coeffi-
cient on age dependency ratio (ADR) (ratio of people in non-working-age rela-
tive to people of working-age) to be significantly negative (in line with the argu-
ment under 2.2). No clear pattern is established for the government budget sur-
plus (implying Ricardian equivalence). Relative income is found to be positively
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connected to the CA (again in line with the theoretical prediction). The capital
stock has a significant positive effect in most specifications (which is in line with
growth models), which is also the case for initial Net Foreign Assets (NFA) (as
expected since payments received on NFA are part of the CA). Extending this
analysis to a total of 54 developing and developed countries and a subsample of
developing countries only sees relative income and Terms of Trade still tend to
be positive (or U-shaped) and significant. Budget surplus however is insignifi-
cant for both samples. Furthermore, ADR has a significant negative effect in the
developing countries samples but no significant effect in the full sample. Error-
correction-specifications and partial-adjustments-specifications for the industrial
country panel lead to similar results for these variables. Furthermore, measures of
enhanced competitiveness (real exchange rate and Terms of Trade) are found to
lead to higher CA positions in the short-run.
Chinn & Prasad (2003) extend this analysis and find the variables with the highest
explanatory power to be fiscal balance (positive effect) and NFA to GDP (positive
but less important for developing countries than for developed ones). Indicators
of financial openness and Terms of Trade variability are however found to be im-
portant drivers in the sample of developing countries. Relative GDP has a positive
significant effect in some of the specifications but overall seems to have higher
explanatory power for industrial countries. Chinn & Ito (2007) is similar to Chinn
& Prasad (2003) in the variable choice and the results for economic fundamentals.
Furthermore, this paper introduces institutional quality (e.g. corruption index, law
and order, or quality of bureaucracy) and finds some of these variables to improve
the fit of the models significantly. Barnes et al. (2010) also find similar variables
to be important determinants of CA positions in OECD countries (GDP per capita,
government net lending, ADR, initial NFA trade openness, and structural rigidi-
ties appear to be their most significant variables).
Gruber & Kamin (2007) find GDP per capita, fiscal balance, openness, and NFA to
be the most important macroeconomic determinants in a country sample consist-
ing of 61 developing and developed nations. Furthermore, their paper introduces
dummies measuring the incidence of financial crises and finds a significant neg-
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ative effect on CA positions but a positive significant one if it is interacted with
openness (therefore, financial crises are predicted to have a positive effect on CAs
if trade openness is sufficiently large). Gossé & Serranito (2014) find the most
important explaining variables of CA imbalances in the short run to be competi-
tiveness (measured either by real exchange rates or by Terms of Trade), oil price,
and productivity gaps for 21 OECD countries. In the medium run their most im-
portant variables are fiscal balance, real exchange rate, private credit to GDP ratio,
GDP per capita, and oil price fluctuations.
Further papers dealing with determinants of CA positions worldwide are Gagnon
(2011) (introducing financial policies such as exchange rate policies as determi-
nants) and Abbas et al. (2011) (mainly focusing of the extent of the “twin deficit”,
namely to which degree the fiscal budget affects CA positions) while Bracke et
al. (2010) includes a more qualitative discussion of potential determinants of
CA imbalances. Other papers have demonstrated that structural policies affect-
ing products, financial, and labor markets have considerable scope to affect CA
imbalances (Kerdrain et al. (2010), Kennedy & Sløk (2005) or Zemanek et al.
(2010) (the last one being specifically about the Euro countries arguing that struc-
tural reforms are a suitable way to increase CA positions in deficit countries of the
EMU)).
Summing up these papers on determinants of CA positions, a few points can be
made. First, it appears that there is widespread agreement on the fundamental
variables that should be included in any specification. Terms of Trade variability,
relative GDP, fiscal surplus, ADR, and a variable capturing competitiveness (e.g.
Terms of Trade or real exchange rate) can be found in almost any paper mentioned
here. Additional variables (e.g. concerning institutional quality or the incidence
of crises) appear to depend on the specific research interests of the authors. Sec-
ond, in some cases the explanatory power of the variables depends on the country
sample under consideration (e.g. Terms of Trade variability in Chinn & Prasad
(2003)). Third, variables affecting CA positions in the short run may differ from
those that are significant in the determination of long-run values.
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4.2 Empirical Literature on Current Accounts in the Eurozone
In the context of the EMU two papers are of particular interest since they sug-
gest that CAs do react more sensitively to relative income and/or growth inside
the EMU. First, Blanchard & Giavazzi (2002) focus on the marginal effect of rel-
ative income on CA positions and estimate it over time for 3 different subsets:
the majority of OECD countries, EU countries, and EMU countries from 1975 to
2001. While for the majority of OECD countries the coefficient is positive most
of the time, it is often insignificant and shows at best a mild upward trend in recent
years. For the EU and the EMU there is a clear upward movement in the estimated
coefficient starting in the late 1980s and becoming statistically significant in the
mid-1990s. Consequently, this result suggests that the sensitivity of CA positions
with respect to relative income has increased over time in the European Union
and the EMU (no significant differences were found between the 2 however) and
that this sensitivity is higher than in the sample with most of the OECD countries.
Second, Lane & Pels (2012) extend this analysis until 2007 and find that this effect
continues to hold for those years. Furthermore, they show a significant negative
effect of growth expectations on CA positions inside the EMU that is growing
over time (and that is especially meaningful for 2002-2007). Consequently, this
2 papers make up a rationale for assuming a stronger effect of relative GDP and
growth for the Euro countries.
Schmitz & von Hagen (2011) compare trade balances of the EU-15 countries (the
15 countries that were members of the EU in 2001 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK)) against the Eurozone and against the whole
world (trade balances were used as a proxy for the CA due to unavailability of CA
data against individual countries). They find that trade balances against the Euro
area already depended on GDP per capita for the countries inside the EMU before
the introduction of the Euro in a positive and significant way. This effect is found
to have increased further after the introduction of the common currency. The trade
balance against the EMU does not significantly depend on GDP per capita how-
ever for the EU members that had not introduced the Euro: Denmark, Sweden,
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and the United Kingdom. When trade balances between EU-15 countries and the
whole sample are examined, the effect of GDP per capita is still positive but there
is no additional effect depending on whether or not the country is a member of
the EMU. Therefore, this paper also suggests that the responsiveness of CAs to
differences in GDP/income is higher inside the EMU even though the effect seems
to operate only for capital flows inside the Euro area.
Belke & Dreger (2011) model the divergence of CAs in the EMU as the out-
come of both a catching-up process and a competitiveness effect (measured as the
real exchange rate) in an error-correction-setting. Their sample of 11 Euro area
members shows competitiveness effects to be the more significant ones leading to
current account deficits in the Southern EMU countries. The empirical relevance
of changes in the real exchange rate for member countries of the EMU has also
been found by Arghyrou & Chortareas (2008) and Estrada & López-Salido (2013).
The latter paper also finds that competitiveness had a significant negative effect
on CA positions most of the time in the EMU between 1985 and 2012 while this
effect was insignificant for the control group of other developed countries. Kang
& Shambough (2013) examine the causes for the building up of large CA deficits
in the EU periphery states Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and the Baltics prior to
the crisis. They find that different factors were responsible for them in the different
countries but that rising Unit Labor Costs (and thus a decrease in competitiveness)
and strong increases in imports following demand booms (that were not matched
by increases in exports of equivalent magnitude) were a common feature to most
of them.
Other papers have shown that CAs for some Euro countries exceeded the val-
ues that would be obtained by using the coefficients for a larger set of countries.
Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon (2010) find additional negative significant effects of be-
ing a Southern European member of the Eurozone after controlling for the usual
macroeconomic variables as it was connected empirically to higher investment
rates. Barnes et al. (2010) also find an additional negative (positive) effect on the
CA position of being a Southern (Central) EMU member after controlling for all
fundamental variables in their sample. These papers suggest that estimations for
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the coefficients of fundamentals derived from larger country samples do not fully
explain CA imbalances in the EMU. They do not determine however whether
the coefficients differ (which is implied by the previously mentioned papers) or
whether the divergence is caused by unobserved variables.
A controversial question is whether the diverging paths of CA positions in the
EMU themselves in this period represent an anomaly. As mentioned previously,
the common currency removes exchange rate risks and improves access to inter-
national capital markets. In fact, there is some evidence that financial integration
has increased substantially overall recently but especially in EMU countries after
the introduction of the Euro, largely due to the abolishment of exchange rate risks
(e.g. Lane (2010) or Fratzscher (2002) see also Baele et al. (2004)). A higher
degree of financial integration is also implied by Blanchard & Giavazzi‘s (2002)
paper, which finds that a positive relationship between investment and saving rates
(the famous Feldstein-Horioka-puzzle from Feldstein & Horioka (1980)) has been
lower and even ceased to exist in the late 1990s in the Euro area.
In the light of this finding, together with increased responsiveness to macroeco-
nomic fundamentals as implied by papers previously mentioned, larger differen-
tials would appear logical for the Eurozone. In fact, Berger & Nitsch (2010) find
that an increase in trade imbalances has been connected to the introduction of
the Euro in a data set following European countries from 1948 to 2008. On the
other hand, Decressin & Stavrev (2009) argue that in their sample, starting in the
early 1990s, CA position divergence can be observed for advanced economies as
a whole and that divergence has not been significantly higher in the EMU.
Summing up the results for empirical papers that focus on the EMU, there seems
to be some indication (however derived from different sources) that at least 3 vari-
ables might have stronger effects in the Euro area. As mentioned throughout the
last paragraphs, previous analysis has found this effect for relative GDP, growth
rates and competitiveness. Despite the potential higher sensitivity of CAs and
the indication of increased financial integration for countries inside the Euro area,
it is not obvious however that the actual size of CA imbalances observed in the
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Euro area in the period under consideration has been abnormal compared to other
country samples.
5 Data and Methodology
Subsequently, the question whether CA positions tend to react more sensitively
in the EMU is addressed empirically. The observation period starts in 1998 be-
cause this was the year when the first 11 participating countries were selected
and conversion rates for the currencies were set. Consequently, it can be argued
that in this year the advantages of the EMU (most notably eradication of currency
risk) began to operate and started having an effect on CAs at least potentially. It
might therefore be assumed that different effects of fundamentals on CA positions
inside the Eurozone compared to other country samples occurred from this year
onwards. The last observations included are from 2009 since it can be considered
the last year before the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis.
The dependent variable is the CA relative to GDP (relCA). Based on the discus-
sion under 2.2 and the empirical findings summarized in 4, I choose the follow-
ing explanatory variables: real GDP per capita divided by US GDP per capita
(relGDP), real exchange rate (REERCPI), government surplus relative to GDP
(fiscsurplus), ADR (ADR), initial NFA relative to GDP (initalNFAGDP), growth
rate (growth) , Terms of Trade variability (ToTvar) (which may induce a precau-
tionary savings motive and has been included in previous empirical analysis, e.g.
Faruqee & Debelle (1996)), and a dummy for oil exporting countries (oilproduce)
(which has also been included in previous research (e.g. Chinn & Ito (2007))
since oil exporting countries may have substantially larger CA positions). Vari-
ables like openness or financial liberalization are deliberately not used as regres-
sors because these might be the kind of variables through which membership in a
currency union affects the sensitivity of CA positions to economic fundamentals.
Overall, the variable choice follows quite closely the discussions in Faruqee &
Debelle (1996), Chinn & Prasad (2003), Chinn & Ito (2007), or Gruber & Kamin
(2007).
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The variables are obtained from the following sources: data on relative CA posi-
tions and fiscal surplus come from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) (22
missing individual observations on fiscal surplus are replaced by World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) data). Data on GDP, growth, real exchange rates based on
Unit Labor Costs (ULC), ADR, Terms of Trade, and oil production come from the
WDI by the World Bank. Real exchange rates based on Consumer Price Indices
(CPI) are obtained from Darvas (2012). Data on NFA to GDP relations are ob-
tained from the updated and extended version of the dataset constructed by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), that has also been applied for this purpose previously
(e.g. Chinn & Prasad (2003) or Chinn & Ito (2007)). Theoretically, the change in
NFA equals the CA as discussed in the introduction. Therefore, instead of current
NFA positions I use the NFA position at the beginning of the observation period
which is also common in the literature (e.g. Chinn & Prasad (2003)). A list of the
variables included together with their sources can be found in Table 6 of Appendix
I while summary statistics can be found in the Tables 8-10.
Two issues with the data set deserve mentioning here. First, differences in NFA
do not equal absolute CA in my actual data. Aside from possible different com-
putational approaches concerning the estimation of these variables by different
institutions, there are a lot of reasons why the NFA position can change with-
out affecting the CA. An interesting coverage of these possible reasons is given
in Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2001). One example given there are exchange rate
changes. According to the authors, Indonesia was indebted in Japanese yen and
suffered a decline in NFA when the yen appreciated, which was not fully reflected
in the CA. Also, recall from the earlier discussion of Johnson‘s paper (2009) that
gross financial flows have been a lot larger than net flows recently. Therefore, val-
uation effects can have a substantial impact on NFA. For reasons like these, CA
positions may differ substantially from the change in NFA in actual data sets.
And second, I will use the database by Darvas (2012) as the source for data on
real exchange rates primarily because it appears to be the largest available one
(using the numbers from the WDI for example would result in the loss of many
countries (also countries that should be considered at least emerging nations like
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Argentina or Hong Kong)). Darvas’ (2012) database, like many real effective in-
terest rate indices, is based on CPI instead of ULC, which is a slight weakness
for the use as a measure for competitiveness. Specifically, a recent paper (Ahn et
al. (2017)) shows that CA positions are significantly negatively correlated with
real exchange rates based on ULC measurement in a sample of 35 developed and
emerging economies from 1995 to 2014. This correlation is found to be absent
however for the relationship between CA positions and real exchange rates based
on CPI. I am fully aware of this potential problem but due to data availability
and the common use of indices based on CPI in the literature (e.g. Arghyrou &
Chortareas (2008), I shall apply this index for the measurement of competitive-
ness. Data from the WDI based on ULC however (REERULC) can and will be
used as a robustness test.
In determining whether CA positions react more sensitively to changes in macroe-
conomic fundamentals, it has to be clarified which kind of countries should be
chosen as the control group. Therefore, I shall proceed in two steps. First, I will
estimate the model for various country subsamples (including the EMU) to de-
termine whether different variables are important regressors for CA positions of
different countries. Varying coefficient estimates for different country samples
have been found empirically (as discussed previously) and are of particular in-
terest for this paper since it seeks to determine whether those estimations appear
to be larger in absolute size inside the EMU. Comparing these estimates against
various subsamples will yield insights whether the effects of fundamentals on CA
positions inside the EMU are unique or can be observed as well for other country
sets that share certain characteristics.
The sample will therefore be divided following a development and a financial
integration argument. For the selection according to development the countries
that are labeled “advanced economies” by the IMF (see IMF (2017) for further
information) are considered separately from those that are not and can thus be
considered developing countries. For the second division I use Chinn & Ito’s
(2006) index for financial integration and take the average of their normalized
index (between 0 and 1) over the whole period. This database is based on the
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IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (de-
tails on its construction can be found in Chinn & Ito (2006)) and is available for
a large sample of countries (In my sample it is not available for Luxembourg and
Brunei Darussalam, so these countries will be considered to have high financial
integration). CA positions of countries that have an average value below 0.5 in the
financial integration index are considered separately from those that have a value
above 0.5. The rationale for this segmentation is that CAs in countries with little
financial integration might react more insensitively to changes in macroeconomic
fundamentals.
In a second step, the countries forming the EMU will then be interacted with those
that are considered advanced economies. I choose to make the comparison that
way because other advanced economies are arguably most similar with respect
to their political, financial, and economic structure to EMU countries. In fact,
all 12 member states of the Eurozone are also classified as advanced economies.
Therefore, when trying to measure the additional effects on CA positions inside
the EMU, it appears reasonable to measure them as the effects that occur on top of
those that are present for advanced economies anyway. These results will indicate
whether observed differences in estimations between EMU countries and other
advanced economies are in fact significant.
In principal, the estimation should take into account that CA positions need not
adjust immediately to changes in fundamental variables. As discussed in 2.1, the
CA can be written as the difference between savings and investment. It seems
to be a plausible assumption that savings and investment decisions do not react
immediately and fully but take some time to adjust. Techniques that have been
used by other empirical papers include taking averages over the whole period
(e.g. Faruqee & Debelle (1996)) or a specified number of years (e.g. Chinn &
Ito (2007)), partial adjustment models (e.g. Bussière et al. (2004)), and error-
correction models (e.g. Belke & Dreger (2011)).
In order to determine an appropriate estimation approach, stationarity of the data
has to be analyzed. For this purpose, I apply the test for unit roots in panels pro-
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posed by Harris and Tzavalis (1999). Monte Carlo simulations ran by the authors
indicate that the test yields results reasonably close to the normal distribution and
has high power for situations with many observations and few years. It is there-
fore very suitable for this dataset with a relatively short time dimension of 12 years
and a cross-section dimension of 139 countries. The null hypothesis of unit roots
in the dependent variable CA to GDP ratio is rejected at any conventional level
while it could clearly not be rejected for the relative GDP (the outcome of the
Harris-Tvavalis test for all regressors that vary over time can be found in Table 11
of Appendix I). This problem can hardly be solved by taking differences because
the resulting variable would measure growth relative to the United States. How-
ever, in order to test for the presence of a development effect, relative GDP has to
be included apart from growth, which might actually have the opposite effect as
explained previously.
Due to these problems, a cross-sectional approach taking averages over the whole
time period will be applied in this paper. A panel set that takes averages over 4
years (and thus will give 3 observations per country) will serve as a further robust-
ness test. As mentioned previously, both approaches are common in the empirical
literature. Consequently, this paper measures medium-term determinants of the
CA. The initially preferred partial-adjustment-model on the other hand is difficult
to implement since it requires the assumption of stationary data. It is therefore not
part of the next chapter. Since the problems in its estimation are quite interesting
however, I include this model along with a discussion of its limitations in the Ap-
pendix II.
Data availability restricts the full data set to 139 countries. The subsamples con-
sist of 111 countries classified as non-advanced economies, 72 countries with low
financial integration, 28 advanced economies, 67 countries with relatively high
financial integration, and 12 EMU countries (a list of all countries together with
symbols indicating in which subsample they are included can be found in Table
5 in the Appendix I). The countries that joined the EMU later (Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have to be dropped from the
dataset. This is necessary because these countries have been inside the EMU for
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only a certain period of the observation time. Due to the missing time structure in
the cross-section there is no way to introduce differences in the responsiveness to
fundamental variables depending on membership in the EMU for these countries.
Therefore, if there is indeed a Euro effect driving up coefficients for fundamental
variables, inclusion of these countries as EMU countries may introduce downward
bias into the interaction variables. In this connection, a slight weakness may be
the inclusion of Greece that joined the EMU in 2001. Since Greece has been a
member in 9 out of the 12 years observed and since it has run particularly large
CA deficits however, estimating the regressions without this country would be
particularly unfortunate. Therefore, its inclusion may be considered a minor and
negligible problem.
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6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Cross-Sectional Sample
Table 1: Cross-Section Results for Different Country Sets
Looking at the full sample, I find relative GDP, fiscal surplus, growth, and the ini-
tial NFA position to be the most significant variables, that also have the expected
sign. A GDP per capita that is higher by one percentage point relative to the US
is predicted to lead to an increase in the CA relative to GDP by approximately
0.02 percentage points, which is line with the theory that relatively poor coun-
tries can attract capital as part of their catching-up process. The negative, albeit
insignificant, coefficient on the ADR implies that a country that has an increase
in the share of the population that is in non-working age relative to the rest by
one percentage point will see its CA decrease by roughly 0.03 percentage points.
As the relative exchange rate is an index that is normalized to 100, the interpre-
tation of the coefficient is that a country that has an average of 101 points there
is predicted to have a CA position increase by roughly 0.01 percentage points.
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This is in opposition to the idea that lower price levels are connected to enhanced
competitiveness encouraging consumption switching to domestic goods and thus
leading to surpluses. The estimation is far away from any conventional level of
significance however.
The initial NFA to GDP ratio enters significantly positively as the payments gained
on assets that are held abroad are part of the CA. An NFA to GDP ratio increase
by 1 percentage point is connected to an increase in the CA position by roughly
0.03 percentage points. Terms of Trade variability has the expected positive but
insignificant sign. The interpretation is that a standard deviation of the Terms of
Trade index (which is normalized at 100) that is higher by 1 point increases the CA
by roughly 0.03 percentage points. The negative coefficient of the average growth
rate is in line with the idea that countries with higher growth rates are more at-
tractive to investors and implies an estimated reduction of the CA by roughly 0.35
percentage points for a growth rate that is higher by 1 percentage point. The fact
that the coefficient on fiscal surplus is significantly positive indicates the absence
of full Ricardian equivalence; the estimation of roughly 0.5 implies however that
only half of an increase in government spending is reflected in a deterioration of
the CA position. Finally, oil exporting countries seem to have higher CA posi-
tions.
The next two columns show the results for developing countries (2) and coun-
tries with low financial integration (3). Compared to the full sample, the positive
impact of relative GDP vanishes. Consequently, lower GDP per capita is unable
to attract foreign investment in developing or financially unintegrated countries.
However, the negative effect of ADR becomes more pronounced, especially for
countries with low financial integration. Growth rate, initial NFA to GDP ratio,
fiscal surplus, and Terms of Trade variability have the expected sign even though
they are not always significant. The real exchange rate has the wrong sign but is
not very significant.
The results for the developed and integrated economies differ slightly. I find ev-
idence for capital flows following low GDP per capita for financially integrated
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countries (even though not for the developed countries sample) while the ADR
loses its negative significance. It seems that a higher number of people of non-
working age in a more developed or financially integrated country does not neces-
sitate foreign indebtedness. The result is similar to Chinn & Ito‘s (2007) inves-
tigation, that also found ADR to be a more significant negative regressor of CA
positions for developing and emerging countries than for industrial ones.
Furthermore, Terms of Trade variability is less of a concern in developed and in-
tegrated countries which is in line with Chinn & Prasad‘s (2003) finding of Terms
of Trade variability increasing CA positions in developing countries but not in
developed ones. The different relevance of both Terms of Trade variability and
ADR with respect to different country samples might indicate better institutions
in more developed countries. NFA and fiscal surplus point into the right direction
and are highly significant while the role of the real exchange rate remains elusive.
Estimations of the effects of fiscal surplus are in line (albeit slightly higher) with
the values obtained by Chinn & Prasad (2003) and Chinn & Ito (2007) with the
exception of the unrealistically high value in (4). The growth channel is found to
operate into the expected direction for the advanced economies but not for the fi-
nancially integrated ones. In all samples, oil exporting countries tend to run large
CA surpluses (the dummy was excluded in (4) since Norway would have been the
only country to which it applies).
Looking at the EMU finally, the coefficients for relative GDP, average growth and
competitiveness are estimated to be particularly large. Based on the empirical lit-
erature on the EMU specifically (e.g. Blanchard & Giavazzi (2002), Lane & Pels
(2012), or Schmitz & Von Hagen (2011)), these are the variables for which an
additional effect of EMU membership is expected the most. Not all of them are
significant but a quadratic specification is found to improve the fit considerably
in (7) (which was not the case for the other subsamples). Previous studies have
also experimented with the inclusion of relative income squared to reflect stage
of development effects. The idea is that initially poor countries cannot attract for-
eign capital but start doing so once they reach a certain degree of development.
Consequently, a U-shape pattern for the effect of relative GDP on the CA would
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be expected (see, e.g. Faruqee & Debelle (1996) or Chinn & Prasad (2003)). Fol-
lowing this logic, the coefficients on relative GDP in this sample have the wrong
signs and instead of a stage of development hypothesis rather suggest a limit for
the effect of relative GDP on CA positions. This however has also been found for
industrial countries previously by Chinn & Prasad (2003).
Comparing the estimated coefficients for the EMU with the other country sam-
ples, it seems that capital is much more predicted to flow to countries with low
relative GDP but high growth rates and high competitiveness in the Eurozone. In
fact, the coefficient estimates for these variables exceed those of all other subsam-
ples suggesting that CAs of Euro countries are especially susceptible to changes
in them. Specifically, CA reactions to changes in these variables appear to be
much stronger than in the sample consisting of 28 advanced economies, which
can be considered to resemble the EMU countries politically and economically
(in fact, the direction of the coefficients resembles most the sample of financially
integrated countries even though the magnitudes are very different). These obser-
vations are definitely in line with the hypothesis of this paper.
However, two caveats deserve mentioning in this connection. The other coeffi-
cients in the EMU sample are all insignificant at the 5% level, which is a bit con-
cerning, especially with respect to fiscal surplus and NFA positions. This, together
with the fact that the coefficient on Terms of Trade variability changes its sign
upon the introduction of relative income squared, might indicate that too many
variables for the 12 observations have been included. Next, the question whether
the differences in the coefficients for EMU countries and advanced economies are
significant is addressed by introducing interaction terms for the countries inside
the Euro area.
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Table 2: Cross-Section Results with Interaction Effects
From Table 1 I conclude that the most important variables for advanced economies
and the EMU appear to be relative GDP, growth, competitiveness, fiscal surplus,
and the initial NFA to GDP ratio. Terms of Trade variability and ADR seem to
play a minor role for advanced economies. This is also confirmed by the first sam-
ple including all variables plus the interaction terms (except for the one with initial
NFA to GDP ratio because it seems hard to imagine why the payments gained on
NFA should depend on being a member of a currency union). The 4 coefficients
are among the least significant ones and are therefore excluded in (2). Signifi-
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cance of the interaction terms rises a little bit, relative GDP and competitiveness
however have the wrong sign (even though they are not very significant). The
other 3 variables are well behaved however. The EMU interaction terms are all
insignificant and also jointly insignificant but at least all enter with the expected
sign. In (3) I exclude the interaction term that is least significant, the one with
fiscal surplus. The interaction terms gain in significance but so do relative GDP
and competitiveness, which have the wrong sign. Therefore, in large parts, the
interaction terms have the effect of bringing the coefficients back to 0. For growth
there is an additional negative EMU effect that is not significant however.
The final two specifications try to address the variables for competitiveness and
relative GDP, which do not behave in the hypothesized way. In (4) I apply a
quadratic specification of relative income as before but without much success (the
4 variables all work in opposite directions while only one of them is significant)
and in (5) I try to address the problem of CPI-based indices by replacing this
variable by the WDI index based on ULC due to the possible superiority of the
latter as explained previously (this leads to the loss of South Korea and Hong
Kong because of data unavailability but these countries did not drive up the co-
efficient for the CPI-index before). This improves the overall fit slightly in the
sense that relative GDP and relative GDP squared do not point into different di-
rections for EMU countries and the remaining ones any longer. Instead, relative
GDP is found to have a positive effect on CAs only up to a certain point, and this
relationship is estimated to be more pronounced for EMU countries. The signs
of the coefficients for competitiveness and its interaction are more intuitive now
but insignificant. Consequently, I find rather limited evidence that CA positions
are significantly more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals (espe-
cially relative GDP, growth, and competitiveness) in the EMU compared to other
advanced economies.
The intercept was excluded in all of these regressions because it has little meaning.
In the full sample CA positions should add up to zero in the absence of measure-
ment errors. In the restricted samples an intercept may indicate a fixed effect, that
is shared by all of the countries in the sample. Therefore, I did check for sig-
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nificance before excluding it. However, I found intercepts to be quite substantial
in size but never significant in any of the specifications above. In the sample of
EMU countries I obtained an intercept of roughly -80 percentage points, which
was insignificant however. There is no plausible qualitative reasoning for this re-
sult (that, however, drives up the other coefficients) except for the small number
of degrees of freedom left.
6.2 Cross-Sectional Sample with Time Structure
In order to test the robustness of the previously obtained results, the estimations
are now repeated for a cross-section in which each observation is the average
over 4 years. Thus, a panel dataset with 3 observations per country is obtained.
This specification has 2 advantages over the previous one. First, it can capture
adjustments that happen within shorter periods, which are invisible in a pure cross-
sectional case. And second, degree of freedoms are less of a concern due to the
higher number of observations. Therefore, inclusion of an intercept is no longer
as costly and will be done subsequently. The exogenous variables will be the
same except for Terms of Trade variability for two reasons. Calculating it over
periods of 4 years will lead to huge variation in this variable and data before 2000
is unavailable for many countries.
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Table 3: Panel Results for Different Country Sets
Table 3 shows that the results are partially similar to those obtained in the pure
cross-sectional case. Relative income has a positive effect in all subsamples ex-
cept for the one with financially unintegrated countries, but the effect is largest
for integrated countries and EMU countries where, again, a quadratic specifica-
tion improves the fit considerably (I tried this for the other subsamples as well but
the changes were negligible). A negative effect of decreased competitiveness is
visible for most samples but is estimated with the largest coefficient for the EMU
countries (despite missing significance). Again, higher ADRs are connected to
decreases in CAs for developing countries (even though insignificantly), which is
not observed for more advanced and integrated economies. In fact, this coefficient
is positive there and even significant for advanced economies and EMU countries.
Higher growth rates induce capital inflows in all samples with similar coefficients
except for the one consisting of advanced economies. Fiscal surplus is strongly
positively significant in all samples (as expected) but the effect is highest in the
EMU, in (5) even exceeding 1, which is a bit illogical since it implies that an in-
crease in government spending leads to a deficit even higher than that spending.
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Again, the slightly surprising result that NFA to GDP ratios matter everywhere
except for the EMU occurs.
Overall, the results are similar to the pure cross-sectional case. This is true es-
pecially for the estimations of the variables capturing relative GDP, initial NFA
to GDP ratio, and fiscal surplus. Furthermore, the coefficient estimations of the
EMU countries resemble most those for integrated countries in direction. As in
the pure cross-sectional case, the behavior of some variables is hard to rational-
ize however. Specifically, it is hard to come up with an explanation for the sig-
nificant positive coefficient on ADR for advanced economies or the absence of
significance for initial NFA to GDP in the Euro area. Furthermore, the behav-
ior of the variable measuring competitiveness appears to be erratic. However, as
in the cross-sectional case, the magnitude of the coefficients indicates that rela-
tive GDP, competitiveness, and growth are important drivers of CAs inside the
EMU, especially when compared with the advanced economies sample. There-
fore, magnitude and significance of these additional effects is estimated with the
help of interaction dummies again subsequently.
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Table 4: Panel Results with Interaction Effects
Specification (1) includes all variables and their interaction terms and thus yields
results that follow from Table 3. Most of the coefficients are in line with the
hypothesized effects, especially the interaction terms have the expected signs (ex-
cept for NFA). Unfortunately, this result does not hold upon removal of the inter-
action term with NFA to GDP, which, as argued before, has little justification to
be included a priori. After its exclusion in (2), most of the interaction terms are
insignificant and have the wrong sign. I again suggest that ADR is not a main
driver of CA positions in this sample and exclude it in (3) with little change. In
(4) I try a quadratic specification again which slightly improves the fit but has the
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very unintuitive result of a U-shape for relative GDP for the whole sample and a
mountain-shape for EMU countries. Also, the competitiveness coefficients point
into the wrong direction. Therefore, I replace the CPI-based index by the ULC-
based one again in (5) which changes the sign for the competitiveness measure
but not for its interaction term.
I find negative intercepts for advanced economies and, on top of that, a negative
impact of being a member of the EMU in 5 out of 6 specifications here (in (5) the
intercept is positive but, on the other hand, the additional intercept from the Euro
is strongly negative). These intercepts are substantial in size but not very signif-
icant which is unsatisfactory in at least two ways. First, the magnitude of these
estimations makes it difficult to ignore them. And second, it seems that countries
see net capital outflows or inflows for reasons not controlled for in the estimation.
In (6) I leave out the intercepts because their inclusion severely influences other
estimates, and overall, they do not seem to be very significant. This definitely
yields the most appealing results with respect to signs since, except for growth,
all variables and interaction terms have the expected sign now. Significance re-
mains low for most of them however. Therefore, as in the cross-sectional case,
the initial observance that relative GDP, competitiveness, and growth rates have
larger effects inside the EMU based on comparing different samples does not hold
in a specification that tries to measure these effects on top of those occurring for
advanced economies.
Overall, these results do not appear to be particularly satisfactory, and, naturally,
poor data quality, especially concerning the observations of developing countries,
could, in parts, be responsible for this. Especially data on ADR and the real ex-
change rate require well-functioning administrations. A further obvious reason
for the results is the quite static approach taking averages over the whole period
or periods of 4 years, that was applied throughout this paper. This approach is
most suitable for the detection of medium-term determinants. Any variability
happening during this period of time however will be invisible in the results by
construction. It might thus be that variable coefficients could be measured in a
more meaningful way using dynamic models. Furthermore, inclusion of addi-
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tional variables could influence the results. I have focused here on those that are
used by practically all empirical papers on the issue, but of course, many authors
have extended this variable choice (most notably by variables capturing institu-
tional quality). As long as those variables are not independent of the actually in-
cluded ones, the latter will be biased. A final potential issue is that the CA might
not reflect consumption and savings decisions well (any longer) in the presence of
gross financial flows that by far exceed CA positions as discussed in 2.3.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored empirically the determinants of CA positions worldwide
with a focus on the EMU during the period from its creation until the beginning
of the sovereign debt crisis. I find that CA positions are determined by different
macroeconomic fundamentals and that different variables are more suitable in ex-
plaining patterns for different country subsamples. For developing and financially
unintegrated countries ADR and Terms of Trade variability are important drivers
of the CA balance while relative income differentials play a more important role
for financially open countries. Government lending/borrowing appears to be more
or less equally important for all country samples.
The question whether countries inside the EMU are particularly sensitive to these
macroeconomic differentials has been analyzed both in a pure cross-sectional case
and for a panel taking averages over 4 years for the time from 1998 to 2009. Com-
paring the estimations for the EMU with those obtained for other country samples,
it appears that countries in the EMU have reacted more sensitively by lower CA
balances to lower relative income, decreased competitiveness, and higher growth
in the period of time considered. The coefficients are estimated to be much larger
for these 3 variables compared to the sample of advanced economies, which can
be considered to be most similar to EMU countries with respect to political, fi-
nancial, and economic structure. Significance is weak however for the estimated
coefficients on growth and competitiveness in the panel case.
Attempts to calculate additional effects that occur for EMU members compared
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to other advanced economies are not successful however. Interaction terms are of-
ten insignificant or point into the wrong direction. Furthermore, a lot of changes
in signs occur upon the inclusion or removal of other variables. Therefore, even
though running different regressions for the different country samples suggests
that the creation of large CA differences in the EMU has been facilitated by the
common currency in the observed period, I do not find this result to be robust or
statistically significant when measured as interaction effects with respect to other
advanced economies. Evidence in favor of such incremental effects is therefore
weak.
The results are not convincing enough to derive clear policy recommendations.
Furthermore, the issue is not very urgent in the light of CA turnarounds after the
beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. However, in my opinion, CA positions in
the EMU should continue to be monitored. I cannot ascertain here that they can
occur more easily within the EMU, but even if they do not, policy makers should
strive to identify their origins. CA differentials in the EMU might be due to a
healthy and welcome catching-up process accompanied by higher growth rates but
might also be caused by deteriorating competitiveness in some countries. In case
the large CA imbalances seen in the past return in the Eurozone, the appropriate
political reaction will depend on the origin of those imbalances.
34
,References
[1] Abbas, S. A., Bouhga-Hagbe, J., Fatás, A., Mauro, P., & Velloso, R. C.
(2011). Fiscal policy and the current account. IMF Economic Review, 59(4),
603-629.
[2] Achen, C. H. (2000). Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the ex-
planatory power of other independent variables. Ann Arbor, 1001(2000),
48106-1248.
[3] Ahn, M. J., Mano, R., & Zhou, J. (2017). Real Exchange Rate and External
Balance: How Important Are Price Deflators?. International Monetary Fund.
[4] Arghyrou, M. G., & Chortareas, G. (2008). Current account imbalances and
real exchange rates in the euro area. Review of International Economics,
16(4), 747-764.
[5] Baele, L., Ferrando, A., Hördahl, P., Krylova, E., & Monnet, C. (2004).
Measuring financial integration in the euro area (No. 14). European Central
Bank.
[6] Barnes, S., Lawson, J., & Radziwill, A. (2010). Current Account Imbalances
in the Euro Area: A Comparative Perspective (No. 826). OECD Publishing.
[7] Belke, A., & Dreger, C. (2011). Current Account Imbalances in the Euro
Area: Catching up or Competitiveness? (No. 241). RWI-Leibniz-Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University,
University of Duisburg-Essen.
[8] Berger, M. H., & Nitsch, V. (2010). The Euro’s Effecton Trade Imbalances
(No. 10-226). International Monetary Fund.
[9] Bernanke, B. S. (2005). The global saving glut and the US current account
deficit (No. 77).
35
[10] Blanchard, O. (2007). Current account deficits in rich countries. IMF staff
papers, 54(2), 191-219.
[11] Blanchard, O., & Giavazzi, F. (2002). Current account deficits in the euro
area: the end of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle?. Brookings papers on eco-
nomic activity, 2002(2), 147-209.
[12] Bracke, T., Bussière, M., Fidora, M., & Straub, R. (2010). A framework for
assessing global imbalances. The World Economy, 33(9), 1140-1174.
[13] Bussière, M., Fratzscher, M., & Müller, G. J. (2004). Current account dy-
namics in OECD and EU acceding countries-an intertemporal approach.
[14] Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2006). What matters for financial development?
Capital controls, institutions, and interactions. Journal of development eco-
nomics, 81(1), 163-192.
[15] Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2007). Current account balances, financial develop-
ment and institutions: Assaying the world “saving glut”. Journal of interna-
tional money and Finance, 26(4), 546-569.
[16] Chinn, M. D., & Prasad, E. S. (2003). Medium-term determinants of current
accounts in industrial and developing countries: an empirical exploration.
Journal of International Economics, 59(1), 47-76
[17] Darvas, Z. (2012). Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new
database (No. 1210). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Re-
gional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
[18] Faruqee, H., & Debelle, G. (1996). What Determines the Current Account?
a Cross-Sectional and Panel Approach (No. 96/58). International Monetary
Fund.
[19] Decressin, M. J., & Stavrev, E. (2009). Current accounts in a currency union
(No. 9-127). International Monetary Fund.
36
[20] Edwards, S. (2004). Thirty years of current account imbalances, current ac-
count reversals and sudden stops (No. w10276). National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
[21] Estrada, Á., Galí, J., & López-Salido, D. (2013). Patterns of convergence
and divergence in the euro area. IMF Economic Review, 61(4), 601-630.
[22] Feldstein, M., & Horioka, C. (1980). Domestic Saving and International
Capital Flows. The Economic Journal, 90(358), 314-329.
[23] Fratzscher, M. (2002). Financial market integration in Europe: on the effects
of EMU on stock markets. International Journal of Finance & Economics,
7(3), 165-193.
[24] Friedman, M. (1957). The permanent income hypothesis. In A theory of the
consumption function (pp. 20-37). Princeton University Press.
[25] Gagnon, J. (2011). Current Account Imbalances Coming Back (No. WP11-
1). Peterson Institute for International Economics.
[26] Giavazzi, F., & Spaventa, L. (2010). Why the current account matters in a
monetary union: lessons from the financial crisis in the euro area.
[27] Gossé, J. B., & Serranito, F. (2014). Long-run determinants of current ac-
counts in OECD countries: Lessons for intra-European imbalances. Eco-
nomic Modelling, 38, 451-462.
[28] Gourinchas, P. O., & Obstfeld, M. (2012). Stories of the twentieth century
for the twenty-first. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(1),
226-265.
[29] Gruber, J. W., & Kamin, S. B. (2007). Explaining the global pattern of cur-
rent account imbalances. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26(4),
500-522.
[30] Harris, R. D., & Tzavalis, E. (1999). Inference for unit roots in dynamic
panels where the time dimension is fixed. Journal of econometrics, 91(2),
201-226.
37
[31] IMF (2017). WEO Groups and Aggregates Information. retrieved from
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/groups.htm#ae
[32] Jaumotte, M. F., & Sodsriwiboon, P. (2010). Current account imbalances in
the southern euro area (No. 10-139). International Monetary Fund.
[33] Johnson, K. H. (2009). Gross or Net International Financial Flows.
[34] Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2011). Financial crises, credit
booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons. IMF Economic Re-
view, 59(2), 340-378.
[35] Keele, L., & Kelly, N. J. (2005). Dynamic models for dynamic theories: The
ins and outs of lagged dependent variables. Political analysis, 14(2), 186-
205.
[36] Kennedy, M., & Slok, T. (2005). Structural Policy Reforms and External
Imbalances (No. 415). OECD Publishing.
[37] Kerdrain, C., Koske, I., & Wanner, I. (2010). The Impact of Structural Poli-
cies on Saving, Investment and Current Accounts (No. 815). OECD Publish-
ing.
[38] Lane, P. (2010). International Financial Integration and the External Posi-
tions of Euro Area Countries (No. 830). OECD Publishing.
[39] Lane, P. R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2001). The external wealth of nations:
measures of foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing coun-
tries. Journal of international Economics, 55(2), 263-294.
[40] Lane, P. R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2007). The external wealth of nations
mark II: Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities,
1970–2004. Journal of international Economics, 73(2), 223-250.
[41] Lane, P. R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2012). External adjustment and the
global crisis. Journal of International Economics, 88(2), 252-265.
38
[42] Lane, P., & Pels, B. (2012). Current Account Imbalances in Europe (No.
8958). CEPR Discussion Papers.
[43] Modigliani, F., & Brumberg, R. (1954). Utility analysis and the consumption
function: An interpretation of cross-section data. Franco Modigliani, 1.
[44] Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1417-1426.
[45] Obstfeld, M. (2012). Does the current account still matter? (No. w17877).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
[46] Obstfeld, M., & Rogoff, K. S. (1996). Foundations of international macroe-
conomics (Vol. 30). Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
[47] Sachs, J. (1981). The Current Account in the Macroeconomic Adjustment
Process (No. 0796). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[48] Sachs, J. (1982). The current account in the macroeconomic adjustment pro-
cess. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 147-159.
[49] Schmitz, B., & Von Hagen, J. (2011). Current account imbalances and finan-
cial integration in the euro area. Journal of International Money and Finance,
30(8), 1676-1695.
[50] Sinn, H. W., & Wollmershäuser, T. (2012). Target loans, current account
balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility. International Tax and
Public Finance, 19(4), 468-508.
[51] Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The
quarterly journal of economics, 70(1), 65-94.
[52] Zemanek, H., Belke, A., & Schnabl, G. (2010). Current account balances
and structural adjustment in the euro area. International Economics and Eco-
nomic Policy, 7(1), 83-127.
39
Appendix I
Albania* Algeria* Angola* Antigua & Barbuda Argentina* Australia# Austria#C
Bahrain Bangladesh* Belarus* Belgium#C Belize* Benin* Bhutan*
Azerbaijan* Bolivia Brazil* Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso* Burundi*
Cabo Verde* Cambodia* Canada# Central African Republic* Chad* Chile China*
Colombia* Comoros* Congo, Dem. Rep.* Congo, Rep.* Costa Rica Cote d‘Ivoire* Croatia
Czech Republic# Denmark# Djibouti Dominican Republic* Ecuador El Salvador Equatorial Guinea*
Eritrea* Fiji* Finland#C France#C Gabon* Georgia Germany#C
Ghana* Greece#C Grenada* Guatemala Guinea* Guinea-Bissau* Guyana
Haiti Honduras* Hong Kong# Hungary Iceland# India* Indonesia
Iran* Ireland#C Israel# Italy#C Jamaica Japan# Jordan
Kazakhstan* Kenya Korea, Rep.*# Kuwait Kyrgyz Republic Lebanon Lesotho*
Luxembourg#C Macedonia* Madagscar* Malaysia* Mauritius Mexico Moldova*
Mongolia Morocco* Mozambique* Namibia* Netherlands#C New Zealand# Nicaragua
Niger* Norway# Oman Pakistan* Panama Papua New Guinea* Paraguay
Peru Philippines* Poland* Portugal#C Romania Russian Federation* Rwanda*
Samoa* Saudi Arabia Senegal* Seychelles Singapore# Solomon Islands* South Africa*
Spain#C Sri Lanka* St. Lucia* St. Vincent & Grenad.* Sudan* Suriname* Swaziland*
Sweden# Switzerland# Tajikistan* Tanzania* Thailand* Togo* Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia* Turkmenistan* Uganda Ukraine* Un. Arab Emirates United Kingdom# United States#
Uzbekistan* Vanuatu Venezuela* Vietnam* Yemen Zambia .
Table 5: List of Countries Included
* financial integration index <.5 on average
# advanced economy according to IMF
C starting member of the EMU in 1998 (including Greece that joined in 2001)
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Variable Description: Source
(av)relCA Current account relative to GDP IMF WEO
(av)fiscsurplus Government net lending/borrowing relative
to GDP
IMF WEO
(av)relGDP (average) Real GDP per capita in constant
2010 US-Dollars relative to the US
WDI
(av)growth (average) real growth rate based on real
GDP in constant 2010 US-Dollars
WDI/own
calculations
(av)ADR (average) Age Dependency Ratio (ratio of
dependents (people younger than 15 or older
than 64) to the population of working age)
WDI
ToTvar Standard deviation of WDI’s Terms of
Trade Index for the years 2000-2009 (base
year:2000=100)
WDI/own
calculations
(av)REERULC (average) Real Effective Exchange Rate
based on ULC (index with base
year:2010=100)
WDI
(av)REERCPI Real Effective Exchange Rate based on CPI
(index with base year:2007=100)
Darvas (2012)
initialNFAGDP Ratio of Net Foreign Assets to GDP at the
beginning of the observation period
Lane &Milesi-
Ferretti
(2007)
oilproduce Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if
oil revenues exceed 2% of GDP on average
over period 1998-2009
WDI/own
calculations
EUROtimesx Interaction terms with independent variables
above
see above
Table 6: List of Variables Included
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Table 7: CA/GDP Ratios in the EMU
42
Table 8: Summary Statistics for Full Sample
Note: No data on financial openness for Luxembourg and Brunei Darussalam
Table 9: Summary Statistics for Advanced Economies
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for Euro Countries
Note: Summary statistics for cross-section with 3 periods are similar
Variable Statistic z p-value
relCA 0.5015 -13.8088 0.0000
relGDP 0.9376 8.6870 1.0000
ADR 0.9674 10.2242 1.0000
REERCPI 0.7250 -2.2818 0.0113
REERULC 0.5203 -9.7053 0.0000
growth 0.2685 -25.8283 0.0000
fiscsurplus 0.3529 -21.4749 0.0000
Table 11: Harris-Tzavalis Unit-Root Tests
Note: H0: Panels contain unit roots
Appendix II
In this section I present the outcome of a partial-adjustment specification and the
problems connected to it. According to the Harris-Tzavalis tests, the null hypoth-
esis of unit roots can be rejected for the relative CA, fiscal surplus, growth, and
competitiveness based on both CPI and ULC in my data. It can clearly not be
rejected for relative GDP and ADR however (as can be seen in Table 11). In the
44
case of ADR this can be addressed by taking first differences (the included vari-
able will thus be diffADR). The absence of stationarity for relative GDP is a greater
problem, as explained previously, and I suggest the following rationale to ignore
it. It has been hypothesized throughout the whole paper (and in fact arguably by
any paper that includes relative GDP as an explanatory variable) that countries un-
dergo a catching-up process that attracts capital for lower stages of development.
If that rationale is applicable, then the relative GDP series should however at least
be mean-reverting and not follow a random walk as the null hypothesis implies.
Instead, it should converge to 100 in the long run. Failure of finding this result as
in this case would then just be due to the brevity of the time period under consid-
eration. Under these (strong) assumptions, a partial-adjustment model, which can
take into account reactions that occur with a lag, can be estimated as
CAi,t = α+ρCAi,t−1 +βXi,t + εi,t
where CA for country i at time t depends on its own lag, an intercept α , and the
variables from above captured by X while ε is the usual error term. β will now
measure the short-run effect of fundamentals on the CA. The long-run effect oc-
curs because variables at time t continue to influence CA positions in the future
through the lagged dependent variable and is thus obtained as β1−ρ . The indepen-
dent variables are in principle the same as before as long as they vary over time and
thus represent a similar variable choice as in the partial-adjustment-estimations of
Faruqee & Debelle (1996) or Bussière et al. (2004).
One more point that deserves to be mentioned is that a lagged dependent variable
necessarily introduces bias into the estimation as has been pointed out by many
(see for example Keele & Kelly (2005)). I will use Pooled OLS because, despite
the bias, estimates can be shown to be consistent. Fixed effect estimations would
be even more problematic as in a case like this with high N but small T they will
not just be biased but also inconsistent as has been shown by Nickell (1981).
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Table 12: Dynamic Model for Different Country Sets
Table 13: Pooled OLS for Different Country Sets
I report results for all subsamples again in Table 12 and two issues are visible.
First, the significance of the lagged dependent variable is extremely high. Ex-
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cluding this variable leads to deteriorations of about 0.3 in R-squared on average
in the 6 country samples as can be seen from comparing it to Table 13. While
high significance is not a problem in itself, it might be here because inclusion of
the lagged dependent variable severely affects the estimations of other variables,
which can be seen in Table 13 again. Without the lagged dependent variable rel-
ative GDP is by far the best performing variable being significant at the 1% level
in all subsamples while it is insignificant in the dynamic specification in 4 out of
6 subsamples.
This result might indicate that the lagged dependent variable takes away some
of the explanatory power from the other variables, thereby biasing them down-
wards. Achen (2000) shows that this can happen with explanatory variables that
follow a stationary autoregressive process (which is very likely for some of the ex-
planatory variables) and serially correlated errors (which are also likely to occur
in panel data sets in general). While OLS estimation without the lagged depen-
dent variable will still yield unbiased estimation results absent other sources of
bias (serial correlation will just make it inefficient), once the lag is introduced, the
coefficients for the explanatory variables will be biased downwards. As demon-
strated by Achen (2000), the bias will be the stronger, the higher persistence is in
the error term and in the explanatory variables.
On the other hand, the serial correlation will drive the coefficient for the lagged de-
pendent variable upwards even if this lagged variable does not even have an effect
on the current one at all! The bias will be the stronger, the higher persistence is in
the serially correlated errors. To quote Achen (2000), the newly included lagged
dependent variable “is a kleptomaniac, picking up the effect, not only of excluded
variables, but also of the included variables if they are sufficiently trended. As a
result, the impact of the included substantive variables is reduced, sometimes to
insignificance” (p. 7). Consequently, it is possible that the lagged CA does not
play a role in the data generating process and is just estimated with high signif-
icance due to serially correlated errors and the autoregressive behavior of other
explanatory variables. While it is impossible to prove that the results are in fact
inconsistent for this reason, the requirements for this inconsistency are probably
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met, and a quick glance at the estimations (especially the jump in R-squared and
the lacking significance of relative GDP after the inclusion of the lagged depen-
dent variable) suggests that it is at least a serious possibility.
And second, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable for the EU sample is
close to unity, which makes all estimated long-run effects go to infinity. This prob-
lem persists even after exclusion of the “problem variable” relative GDP. Hence,
a partial adjustment model is impossible to estimate. The Pooled OLS estimation
in Table 13 is unable to capture any long-run effects and will therefore not be dis-
cussed at length. It appears remarkable however that most effects are estimated
with the same sign for the different samples (the exceptions being competitive-
ness for developing countries and diffADR in the Eurozone) and point into the
expected directions with satisfactory significance (except for competitiveness).
Higher absolute coefficients of fundamental variables for the EMU however are
not obtained.
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